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Equity--Laches--Statute
of Limitations
LAW QUARTERLY
VIRGINIA
WESTCohen:

EQuiTY

-

LACHES -

STATUTE OF LIMTATiONS. -

W in 1912

left the following memorandum to defendant:
"This is to sertify (sic) that I have got and used to the
amount of six hundred and forty two dollars and forty five
cts. from Irven Milam. I further agree that if I should have
any interest in the A. B. Milam estate that my interest shall
stand good to Irven Milam for the amount of six hundred
and forty two dollars and forty five cts. for value received
with interest from date".
Six years later, the father died, leaving part of his estate to
W, sufficient to pay off his debt to the defendant. W absenting
himself for the statutory period, was presumed dead. In 1930,
an administrator of W's personal estate was appointed. By
authority of the statute, said administrator instituted a suit in
From an adverse
equity, in which defendant was a creditor.
decree, defendant appealed. Plaintiff urged that the debt was
barred by the Statute of Limitations. The decree was reversed,
however, on the grounds that the memorandum, creating a "trust
or lien", was purely a matter of equitable nature and was unaffected by the Statute of Limitations. Lewis v. Milam.'
The court could have disposed of the bar of the Statute of
Limitations by showing that it had not yet expired at the commencement of the suit.2 But, assuming hypothetically that sufficient time had actually elapsed for the statute to become effective,
and that more than a technical right of action was available,' the
rationale of the court merits criticism.
The memorandum lacks the element of a trust, either express,'
1169 S. E. 70 (W. Va. 1933).
2W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 104, § 17; W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1932) § 5408: "If a person die before the time at which any right
mentioned in this article would have accrued to him if he had continued
alive, and there would be an interval of more than five years between the
death of such person and the qualification of his personal representative,
such personal representative shall, for the purposes of this article be deemed
This statute has been
to have qualified on the last day of such five years."
interpreted to mean that the Statute of Limitations will not apply until
the personal representative has qualified, or upon failure to qualify, it is
to be counted from the end of five years. Crawford v. Turner, 67 W. Va.
564, 68 S. E. 179 (1910). The difficulty in applying the Statute of Limitations is in determining when W actually died, apart from the fact of death.
If one computes actual death from the end of the seven year statutory span,
W would have died in 1919, and the administrator presumed appointed in
1924. The statute would not then apply until 1934.
'The unusual circumstances of the case would give the defendant only
a technical right of action because there was no one against whom suit could
be brought within the intermediate time.
'PmY ox TaUSTS ArD TRUsTEEs (7th ed. 1929) § 24.
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It more clearly resembles an equitable lien, arising from a specifically enforceable executory contract to secure a past debt.' Although W's debt may be subsumed
under the category of past consideration, it has been held sufficient
to give validity to a contract.8 This clears the hurdle of sufficient
consideration demanded by equity before it will enforce an
executory agreement.'
Disregarding the effectiveness of the
remedy, it would seem that an action at law on the contract was
available.
In cases in which equity and law have "concurrent jurisdiction", it has been recognized that equity will apply the Statute
of Limitations by analogy," ° and avoid the wider. application of
laches.' Concurrent jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that
equity and law will give identical relief in a partieulai case. It
embraces cases in which the relief given in equity is of superior
calibre to that given at law."
constructive,' or resulting.!

5

lbid. § 27.
Glbid. §§ 124, 125.
POmEnoY, EQuITY JuRIsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 1236, 1237; JONES
ox LoNs (3rd ed. 1914) §§ 27, 42.
sWH.LISTON ON CONTRACTS (1920) § 142.
9
PomERoY, op. cit. supra § 1293.
20POmERoY, op. cit. supra §§ 419, 139; WALSH, EQUry (1930) 474; Clark
v. Gruber, 74 W. Va. 533, 82 S. E. 338 (1914) ; Crawford's Adm'r v. Turner's
Adm'r, 67 W. Va. 564, 68 S. E. 179 (1910); Mace v. Collieries Corp., 111
W. Va. 532, 163 S. E. 37 (1932); Wilsons v. Harper, 25 W. Va. 179 (1884);
Maxwell v. Wilson, 54 W. Va. 495, 46 S. E. 349 (1903); Newberger v. Wells
and Leonard, 51 W. Va. 624, 42 S. E. 625 (1901).
n Sibley v. Stacey, 53 W. Va. 292, 44 S. E. 420 (1903).
12 n Newberger v. Wells, supra n. 10, plaintiff presented a bill in equity
to correct a mistake of quantity of land named in a deed, and asked for a
money decree for the remainder. The land had been deeded with a general
warranty. Equity took jurisdiction on the grounds of mistake, despite the
fact that no lien for purchase money was reserved in the deed, as required
by statute. It was held that in the absence of fraud, the jurisdiction being
concurrent, the Statute of Limitations applied. To show the inadequacy of
the legal remedy the court said: "The mistake or fraud has therefore caused
them to do that which materially affected their interest very much to their
detriment. It has converted their property into a mere unsecured claim for
money, and if the defendant in this case were insolvent, the result would be
irreparable loss and injury to them." Ibid. p. 632. In Clark v. Gruber,
supra n. 10, plaintiff furnished decedents with boarding and lodging. No
agreement was made in decedent's lifetime to pay for the services because
plaintiff, being a son-in-law, expected to receive recompense through decedent's
will. But decedent remarried, made a new will, and omitted the compensation that plainiff sought. Plaintiff brought a creditor's bill in equity,
seeking a settlement of the accounts of the administratrix. Prom the facts
of the case, the court implied a contract to pay for the board and lodging.
The court decided that "equity follows the law literally in applying the
statute of limitations," but that the contract being a "continuing one",
the statutory limit had not yet elapsed. It would seem that the legal remedy
would, have been inadequate, for the facts disclosed that there were not
.
sufficient personal assets to pay the plaintiff's debt.
7
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The principal case, not within the exclusive realm of equity,'
could more clearly fit into the niche of "concurrent jurisdiction".
Shorn of its factual complications which allow only a technical
right of action at law, there is sufficient ground to warrant
analogous application of the Statute of Limitations. To deny its
application would lead to the anomalous situation of giving more
protection to an incomplete mortgage, than a complete one not
based on any contingent future interest.
One might venture to offer the "concurrent jurisdiction"
cases as one example indicative of the breakdown of the rigid
breach between law and equity.

-JuLIus COHEN.

INJUNCTIONS -

RESTRAINING

UNLICENSED

PRACTICE

OP

EmcnTE. - There is a statute which makes the practice of medicine without complying to licensing requirements a misdemeanor.
P, in interest of himself and others similarly situated was awarded an injunction to restrain D in his unlawful practice. The lower
court sustained a demurrer to the bill and certified its ruling for
review. The Supreme Court simply calls P's license a franchise,
a valuable property interest, which he can protect by enjoining one
without a license. Sloan v. Mitchell.'
The court reaches a wholesome result which can well be supported although there is some contrary authority.
2 One of the most typical examples in which equity takes exclusive jurisdiction is in the case of a trust. Emphasis is given to its "purely equitable" character, and the Statute of Limitations will not apply by analogy.
Patrick v. Stark, 62 W. Va. 606, 59 S. E. 606 (1907); Currence v. Ward,
43 W. Va. 367, 27 S. E. 329 (1897); Heiskell v. Powell, 23 W. Va. 717
(1883) ; Marinack v. Blackburn, 93 W. Va. 585, 116 S. E. 7 (1923) ; PoMEROY,
op. cit. supra § 419.
"Pound, Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 CoL. L. REv. 20, at p. 23: "The
anti-legal element has come to be a minimum once more, a work of liberalization being accomplished, the system whereby it was brought about remains
merely as an accident of judicial administration, requiring men for historical
reasons to seek relief here rather than there, or in this way rather than
that, without sensibly affecting the substance or rules applied."

1 168 S. E. 800 (W. Va. 1933).
(The court
2Drunmond v. Rowe, 155 Va. 725, 156 S. E. 442 (1931).
refused an injunction to P, a veterinary, against D who had not taken the
examination required by statute.) Healy v. Sidone, 127 Atl. 520 (N. J.
1923). (The statute was not passed for benefit of P.) Merz v. Murchison,
30 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 646 (1908). (No injunction will issue where P only
urges a diminution of profits by means of unlawful competition. There is
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